Digital Government Auditability Act

By /

Model Act Generated from the NSIR / CLIP Clean-System Framework

Long Title

An Act to establish auditability, transparency, public control, accountability, reversibility, and citizen-legibility requirements for digital government systems; to govern portals, databases, digital identity systems, case-management systems, dashboards, cloud services, vendor platforms, data-sharing infrastructure, automated workflows, and other digital public-administration systems; and to ensure that digital government remains lawful, auditable, appealable, correctable, exit-capable, and democratically accountable.

Preamble

Whereas public administration increasingly operates through digital systems, including service portals, databases, cloud infrastructure, identity systems, case-management systems, payment systems, dashboards, vendor platforms, workflow tools, data-sharing arrangements, automated processes, and artificial intelligence systems;

Whereas digital government may improve service delivery, accessibility, speed, coordination, public reporting, and institutional learning;

Whereas digital systems can also make public power less visible when authority, data flows, decision pathways, vendor dependencies, audit logs, and appeal mechanisms are hidden behind interfaces, platforms, procurement contracts, or technical architecture;

Whereas a citizen should not lose access to rights, benefits, services, appeal, correction, or public accountability because a public system has been digitized;

Whereas digital convenience must not become invisible public power;

Whereas public authorities should not procure, operate, or depend on digital systems they cannot inspect, audit, govern, modify, exit, or explain;

Whereas digital government must preserve lawful authority, public records, privacy, cybersecurity, accessibility, procedural fairness, meaningful human review, auditability, reversibility, and public accountability;

Whereas a public system should be mapped before it is digitized, integrated, automated, or scaled;

Therefore, Parliament enacts as follows.

Part 1 — Short Title, Purpose, and Core Principles

1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the Digital Government Auditability Act.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this Act is to ensure that digital government systems are designed, procured, operated, integrated, reviewed, and decommissioned in a manner that preserves:

  1. lawful and bounded public authority;
  2. public purpose;
  3. citizen legibility;
  4. data-flow visibility;
  5. auditability;
  6. accessibility;
  7. privacy and cybersecurity;
  8. public record control;
  9. meaningful human review;
  10. appeal and remedy;
  11. vendor auditability;
  12. interoperability;
  13. exit capability;
  14. service continuity;
  15. democratic accountability.

3. Core Rule

A public authority shall not deploy, procure, expand, integrate, automate, or materially alter a high-impact digital government system unless the system has been mapped, assessed for auditability, reviewed for privacy and cybersecurity, tested for service continuity, and determined to preserve public control, citizen access, appealability, data correction, and exit capability.

4. Digital Stack Visibility Principle

A public authority shall ensure that the digital stack through which public power operates remains visible to lawful oversight.

The digital stack includes, where applicable:

  1. legal authority;
  2. policy rules;
  3. service portals;
  4. authentication and identity systems;
  5. databases;
  6. data-sharing arrangements;
  7. cloud infrastructure;
  8. case-management systems;
  9. payment systems;
  10. dashboards;
  11. vendor platforms;
  12. automated workflows;
  13. AI or algorithmic systems;
  14. audit logs;
  15. appeal and correction pathways;
  16. public reporting systems.

5. Public Control Principle

A public authority shall not use a digital system for high-impact public administration unless the authority retains sufficient legal, technical, operational, contractual, and institutional control to inspect, audit, modify, suspend, exit, or replace the system where necessary.

6. Non-Digital Access Principle

Where a digital government system affects rights, benefits, eligibility, essential services, legal status, enforcement exposure, housing, health, education, immigration, taxation, social supports, identity, public safety, or other high-impact public interests, the responsible authority shall ensure that affected persons have reasonable access to non-digital assistance, alternative access, accommodation, or human support where digital-only access would create exclusion, unfairness, or serious harm.

7. No Accountability Laundering

A public authority shall not avoid responsibility for a public decision, service failure, exclusion, data error, delay, denial, or harm by attributing the outcome to a portal, database, vendor platform, cloud provider, identity system, automated workflow, or technical architecture.

Human public accountability remains.

Part 2 — Definitions

8. Definitions

In this Act:

“affected person” means a person, household, organization, community, Indigenous government, business, public body, or legal entity whose rights, benefits, obligations, eligibility, access, service level, enforcement exposure, legal status, privacy, property, livelihood, mobility, safety, or public interest may be materially affected by a digital government system.

“audit log” means a record of system activity sufficient to reconstruct material actions, access, changes, data use, decisions, transactions, incidents, errors, overrides, appeals, corrections, vendor actions, and administrative operations.

“case-management system” means a digital system used by a public authority to manage applications, files, benefits, permits, inspections, investigations, enforcement actions, service requests, appeals, or other public-administration processes.

“cloud service” means any remote computing, storage, processing, hosting, analytics, AI, platform, infrastructure, or software service used by a public authority.

“critical digital system” means a high-impact digital government system whose failure, breach, exclusion, loss, vendor disruption, data error, audit failure, or unavailability could materially affect rights, essential services, public safety, emergency response, national security, critical infrastructure, public finance, public trust, or continuity of government.

“data-flow map” means a documented account of what data is collected, generated, inferred, accessed, shared, retained, corrected, deleted, reused, exported, or processed within or across a digital government system.

“digital fallback” means a non-digital, assisted-digital, human-supported, or alternative pathway sufficient to preserve access, fairness, service continuity, appeal, correction, or remedy where a person cannot reasonably use the digital system.

“digital government system” means any digital, software, cloud, platform, database, portal, identity, workflow, case-management, dashboard, payment, records, data-sharing, analytics, AI, automation, or vendor system used to exercise, support, manage, report, or deliver public authority, public administration, public services, public benefits, enforcement, procurement, or public decisions.

“digital identity system” means a digital system used to establish, verify, authenticate, credential, authorize, manage, or mediate a person’s identity, access, status, eligibility, or relationship to public services.

“digital service portal” means a public-facing or staff-facing digital interface through which a person accesses public services, submits information, receives decisions, communicates with public authorities, pays fees, uploads documents, checks status, or initiates appeals or corrections.

“exit capability” means the legal, contractual, technical, operational, financial, and organizational ability of a public authority to leave, replace, decommission, migrate, or suspend a digital system without unacceptable harm to public records, service continuity, affected persons, public accountability, security, or legal obligations.

“high-impact digital government system” means a digital government system that materially affects, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, rights, benefits, eligibility, access to essential services, legal status, enforcement, identity, privacy, public safety, housing, immigration, taxation, health, education, child welfare, policing, procurement, public finance, emergency response, critical infrastructure, or other significant public interests.

“interoperability” means the ability of digital systems to exchange, interpret, preserve, export, and use data or records in a lawful, secure, documented, auditable, and portable manner.

“meaningful human support” means access to a human public servant or authorized human representative capable of explaining the process, assisting with access, addressing errors, escalating urgent issues, and connecting an affected person to review, correction, or appeal pathways.

“public authority” means a department, ministry, agency, Crown corporation, tribunal, regulator, public office, municipality, delegated authority, contractor acting under public authority, or other body exercising public functions under law.

“public record control” means the authority and practical ability of a public authority to access, preserve, export, manage, audit, disclose, transfer, and retain public records in accordance with law, regardless of vendor involvement.

“responsible authority” means the public authority legally responsible for the design, procurement, deployment, operation, integration, review, suspension, or decommissioning of a digital government system.

“service continuity plan” means a plan to maintain or restore access to public services, records, decisions, appeals, payments, benefits, emergency functions, or essential operations during system outage, cyber incident, vendor failure, transition, rollback, or decommissioning.

“system map” means a documented representation of the purpose, authority, actors, institutions, vendors, technical components, workflows, data flows, decision points, outputs, feedback loops, appeal paths, audit logs, automation components, security controls, risks, and correction mechanisms of a public system.

“vendor platform” means any digital, software, cloud, database, AI, case-management, identity, analytics, dashboard, records, or service platform supplied, hosted, maintained, configured, or substantially controlled by a third party.

Part 3 — Application and Classification

9. Application

This Act applies to every high-impact digital government system that is developed, procured, deployed, authorized, operated, funded, integrated, materially modified, or relied upon by a public authority.

10. High-Impact Classification

A digital government system shall be classified as high-impact if it affects, or is reasonably likely to affect:

  1. eligibility for public benefits, permits, grants, licenses, housing, health, education, immigration, taxation, or social supports;
  2. access to essential public services;
  3. legal status, identity, liberty, mobility, livelihood, property, or privacy;
  4. enforcement, inspection, investigation, penalties, sanctions, policing, corrections, border administration, or compliance actions;
  5. public safety, emergency response, national security, critical infrastructure, or continuity of government;
  6. public procurement, public finance, public funds, or public assets above a prescribed threshold;
  7. appeals, complaints, human review, ombuds processes, tribunals, or administrative justice;
  8. data-sharing across departments, jurisdictions, vendors, platforms, or programs;
  9. any other matter prescribed by regulation.

11. Critical Digital Systems

A responsible authority shall designate a high-impact digital government system as critical where system failure, outage, breach, exclusion, data loss, audit failure, vendor failure, or inability to exit could create serious harm to rights, essential services, safety, infrastructure, public finance, security, public trust, or continuity of government.

Critical digital systems shall be subject to enhanced cybersecurity review, privacy review, service continuity planning, independent audit, red-team testing, and exit capability requirements.

12. Prohibition on Avoidance

A responsible authority shall not divide, outsource, relabel, technically reclassify, migrate, integrate, or embed a digital system within another system for the purpose of avoiding this Act.

13. Contractor and Vendor Systems

Where a public authority uses a contractor, vendor, platform provider, cloud provider, consultant, delegated body, or third-party system to perform or support high-impact public administration, the responsible authority remains accountable under this Act.

Part 4 — Digital System Mapping

14. System Mapping Requirement

Before implementing, procuring, integrating, materially altering, scaling, or replacing a high-impact digital government system, the responsible authority shall prepare a system map.

15. Contents of System Map

A system map shall identify:

  1. public purpose;
  2. legal authority;
  3. responsible authority;
  4. accountable officials;
  5. affected persons and affected communities;
  6. public services or decisions supported;
  7. technical components;
  8. vendors and subcontractors;
  9. cloud, hosting, and infrastructure dependencies;
  10. databases and records systems;
  11. identity and authentication layers;
  12. portals and user interfaces;
  13. case-management workflows;
  14. automated workflows;
  15. AI or algorithmic components;
  16. data flows;
  17. access controls;
  18. audit logs;
  19. cybersecurity controls;
  20. privacy controls;
  21. human support points;
  22. appeal, complaint, redress, and correction pathways;
  23. service continuity arrangements;
  24. exit capability;
  25. failure modes;
  26. rollback or decommissioning pathways.

16. Public System Map

The responsible authority shall publish a citizen-readable version of the system map unless publication would create a serious and demonstrable security, privacy, or legal risk.

Where full publication is restricted, the responsible authority shall publish a summary sufficient to explain:

  1. what the system does;
  2. who is responsible;
  3. who is affected;
  4. what services or decisions it supports;
  5. what data categories it uses;
  6. whether AI or automation is involved;
  7. how users get human support;
  8. how errors are corrected;
  9. how decisions are appealed;
  10. how the system is audited;
  11. how the system can be suspended, replaced, or exited.

17. Restricted Technical Annex

Where security, privacy, law enforcement, national security, commercial confidentiality, or cybersecurity concerns prevent full publication, the responsible authority shall maintain a restricted technical annex for authorized auditors, oversight bodies, courts, tribunals, privacy commissioners, cybersecurity authorities, legislative committees, and other lawful reviewers.

Confidentiality shall not eliminate auditability.

Part 5 — Data-Flow Visibility and Public Data Control

18. Data-Flow Map Requirement

Every high-impact digital government system shall maintain a data-flow map.

19. Contents of Data-Flow Map

A data-flow map shall identify:

  1. data collected;
  2. legal authority for collection;
  3. source of data;
  4. data categories;
  5. personal, sensitive, inferred, derived, aggregated, or anonymized data;
  6. data generated by the system;
  7. data shared with other public authorities;
  8. data shared with vendors or subcontractors;
  9. data shared across jurisdictions;
  10. data retained;
  11. data deleted, archived, anonymized, or de-identified;
  12. data correction pathways;
  13. data-access permissions;
  14. data-security controls;
  15. audit logs of access and changes;
  16. secondary uses;
  17. AI or automation uses;
  18. risks created by data errors, integration, reuse, or sharing.

20. Data Correction Pathway

An affected person shall have a practical pathway to request inspection and correction of relevant personal or case data used in a high-impact digital government system.

21. Material Data Error

Where a digital government system materially relies on incorrect, stale, incomplete, unlawfully obtained, misapplied, or mismatched data, the responsible authority shall provide correction, reconsideration, and remedy where appropriate.

22. Secondary Use Control

Data collected for one public purpose shall not be used for a materially different high-impact purpose without:

  1. lawful authority;
  2. public notice;
  3. updated data-flow map;
  4. systems integrity review;
  5. privacy review;
  6. auditability controls;
  7. correction pathway;
  8. appeal or remedy where affected persons may be materially harmed.

23. Cross-System Data Integration

Before integrating data across public systems, departments, jurisdictions, programs, or vendor platforms, the responsible authority shall assess:

  1. legal authority;
  2. public purpose;
  3. data quality;
  4. privacy risk;
  5. cybersecurity risk;
  6. affected population;
  7. potential exclusion or error propagation;
  8. appeal and correction pathways;
  9. auditability;
  10. rollback or disconnection capability.

Part 6 — Digital Identity, Authentication, and Access

24. Digital Identity Safeguards

A digital identity system used for high-impact public administration shall be lawful, necessary, proportionate, secure, auditable, correctable, accessible, and subject to meaningful public control.

25. Digital Identity System Map

A digital identity system shall maintain a system map identifying:

  1. purpose;
  2. authority;
  3. services connected;
  4. identity attributes collected;
  5. authentication methods;
  6. credential issuance;
  7. revocation process;
  8. access logs;
  9. correction process;
  10. appeal process;
  11. vendor dependencies;
  12. cybersecurity controls;
  13. privacy controls;
  14. fallback access;
  15. service-continuity plan;
  16. expansion limits.

26. No Hidden Expansion

A digital identity system shall not be materially expanded to new services, new data uses, new enforcement uses, new eligibility determinations, new vendors, new jurisdictions, or new automated decision systems without updated public notice, systems integrity review, privacy review, cybersecurity review, and approval by the responsible authority.

27. Access and Exclusion Protection

Where digital identity is required or substantially necessary to access a high-impact public service, the responsible authority shall provide reasonable accommodation, assisted access, or alternative access for persons who cannot reasonably use the digital identity system.

28. No Unreviewable Denial of Access

A person shall not be denied access to essential public services because of a digital identity error, authentication failure, credential mismatch, inaccessible interface, system outage, or vendor failure unless a meaningful human support and review path is available.

29. Identity Error Correction

The responsible authority shall provide a timely process to correct identity errors, account lockouts, credential mismatches, access denials, or authentication failures that materially affect access to high-impact public services.

Part 7 — Service Portals and Citizen Access

30. Portal Legibility Requirement

A digital service portal used for high-impact public administration shall provide clear information about:

  1. responsible authority;
  2. public purpose;
  3. required information;
  4. legal authority;
  5. steps in the process;
  6. expected timelines;
  7. status of application or request where applicable;
  8. use of AI or automation;
  9. human support;
  10. appeal or complaint pathway;
  11. data correction pathway;
  12. privacy and security practices.

31. Status Visibility

Where a digital portal is used to manage applications, requests, benefits, permits, reviews, appeals, or service delivery, the responsible authority shall provide affected persons with reasonable status visibility unless restricted by law.

32. Human Support Requirement

A high-impact digital service portal shall provide meaningful human support where:

  1. the user cannot access the system;
  2. the system fails;
  3. the user is vulnerable or requires accommodation;
  4. the matter is urgent;
  5. rights, benefits, eligibility, legal status, enforcement exposure, or essential services may be affected;
  6. automated or scripted support is insufficient.

33. Accessibility

A high-impact digital service portal shall comply with applicable accessibility standards and shall be tested for practical usability by affected populations, including persons with disabilities, low digital literacy, language barriers, limited connectivity, or other access constraints.

34. No Digital Dead End

A digital government system shall not create a dead end where a person cannot reach human support, correct data, obtain reasons, submit evidence, appeal a decision, or preserve access to essential services.

Part 8 — Case-Management Systems, Dashboards, and Administrative Workflows

35. Case-Management Auditability

A case-management system used for high-impact public administration shall preserve records sufficient to reconstruct:

  1. file creation;
  2. data entry;
  3. document uploads;
  4. status changes;
  5. workflow routing;
  6. staff actions;
  7. automated actions;
  8. AI or algorithmic involvement;
  9. decisions;
  10. reasons;
  11. communications;
  12. appeals;
  13. corrections;
  14. deletions;
  15. overrides;
  16. vendor or system changes.

36. Workflow Transparency

A responsible authority shall document material workflow rules used in a high-impact digital government system, including rules that prioritize, route, delay, escalate, classify, approve, deny, flag, or close files.

37. Dashboard Integrity

A dashboard used for high-impact public management, oversight, resource allocation, enforcement, prioritization, or public reporting shall identify:

  1. data sources;
  2. metric definitions;
  3. update frequency;
  4. exclusions;
  5. uncertainty;
  6. known limitations;
  7. responsible owner;
  8. audit process;
  9. risks of metric distortion;
  10. whether dashboard outputs influence decisions.

38. No Metric Substitution

A public authority shall not treat a dashboard metric as a substitute for lawful judgment, human review, public purpose, or affected-person evidence.

39. Administrative Override Record

Where a public servant overrides, modifies, rejects, or accepts a system recommendation in a high-impact workflow, the system shall preserve a record sufficient for audit and review where the action materially affects an affected person.

Part 9 — Cybersecurity, Privacy, and Resilience Review

40. Cybersecurity Review

Before deployment of a high-impact digital government system, the responsible authority shall complete a cybersecurity review.

The review shall assess:

  1. threat model;
  2. access controls;
  3. authentication;
  4. encryption;
  5. logging;
  6. vulnerability management;
  7. incident response;
  8. third-party dependencies;
  9. supply-chain risk;
  10. cloud and hosting risk;
  11. data backup;
  12. recovery process;
  13. continuity of service;
  14. security testing.

41. Privacy Review

Before deployment of a high-impact digital government system, the responsible authority shall complete a privacy review.

The review shall assess:

  1. lawful collection;
  2. purpose limitation;
  3. data minimization;
  4. consent or notice where applicable;
  5. sensitive data;
  6. data sharing;
  7. secondary use;
  8. retention;
  9. deletion;
  10. anonymization or de-identification;
  11. re-identification risk;
  12. affected-person rights;
  13. correction process;
  14. privacy incident response.

42. Resilience Review

A critical digital system shall undergo resilience review.

The review shall assess:

  1. outage risk;
  2. cyber incident risk;
  3. vendor failure;
  4. data loss;
  5. authentication failure;
  6. cloud dependency;
  7. service continuity;
  8. backup process;
  9. recovery time;
  10. recovery point;
  11. public communication;
  12. continuity of appeal and remedy;
  13. fallback access;
  14. decommissioning or migration risk.

43. Red-Team Testing

A critical digital government system shall be subject to red-team testing before deployment and at prescribed intervals.

Red-team testing shall assess how the system could fail, exclude affected persons, hide error, block appeal, expose data, resist audit, create vendor dependency, or lose service continuity.

Part 10 — Vendor Auditability, Public Records, and Exit Capability

44. Vendor Auditability Requirement

A public authority shall not procure, deploy, or rely on a vendor-provided digital system for high-impact public administration unless the contract preserves public auditability, public record control, data portability, interoperability, service continuity, and exit capability.

45. Required Contract Terms

A contract for a high-impact digital government system shall require:

  1. public audit rights;
  2. access to relevant logs;
  3. system documentation;
  4. data dictionary or equivalent documentation;
  5. configuration documentation;
  6. change logs;
  7. security testing cooperation;
  8. incident reporting;
  9. privacy compliance;
  10. public records compliance;
  11. data portability;
  12. interoperability;
  13. subcontractor disclosure;
  14. material change notification;
  15. decommissioning support;
  16. exit transition assistance;
  17. continuity support;
  18. prohibition on undisclosed material system changes;
  19. compliance with this Act.

46. Public Record Control

A public authority shall retain control over public records held, processed, stored, generated, or managed by a vendor system.

A vendor shall not prevent lawful access, audit, export, preservation, disclosure, transfer, correction, or deletion of public records.

47. Vendor Secrecy

Trade secret, intellectual property, commercial confidentiality, contractual confidentiality, or vendor security claims shall not prevent authorized audit, legal review, privacy review, cybersecurity review, public records access, appeal review, or oversight of a high-impact digital government system.

48. Data Portability

A high-impact digital government system shall support lawful export of public records, metadata, audit logs, configuration information, and data necessary for continuity, migration, audit, appeal, legal review, and decommissioning.

49. Interoperability

A high-impact digital government system shall support interoperability sufficient to prevent avoidable vendor lock-in, preserve public records, support lawful integration, and enable exit or replacement.

50. Exit Plan

A responsible authority shall maintain an exit plan for each high-impact vendor digital system.

The exit plan shall identify:

  1. triggering conditions;
  2. alternative service pathway;
  3. data export process;
  4. record preservation;
  5. continuity of essential services;
  6. transition requirements;
  7. vendor cooperation duties;
  8. decommissioning process;
  9. risk to affected persons;
  10. public communication plan;
  11. timeline for exit.

Part 11 — Audit Logs and Recordkeeping

51. Audit-Log Duty

Every high-impact digital government system shall preserve audit logs sufficient to reconstruct material actions, access, decisions, data uses, workflow changes, automated steps, appeals, corrections, incidents, and system changes.

52. Contents of Audit Logs

Audit logs shall include, where applicable:

  1. user access;
  2. system access;
  3. vendor access;
  4. data creation;
  5. data modification;
  6. data deletion;
  7. data sharing;
  8. automated workflow action;
  9. AI or algorithmic action;
  10. staff action;
  11. decision record;
  12. reasons record;
  13. appeal or review record;
  14. correction record;
  15. override record;
  16. incident record;
  17. configuration change;
  18. model or rules change;
  19. security event;
  20. export or migration action.

53. Log Integrity

Audit logs shall be protected against unauthorized alteration, deletion, concealment, or tampering.

54. Retention

Audit logs and records required by this Act shall be retained for a period sufficient to support appeal, audit, legal review, privacy review, cybersecurity investigation, public accountability, and systemic correction.

55. Tampering and Destruction

A person shall not knowingly destroy, alter, conceal, or prevent access to audit logs or records required under this Act.

Part 12 — Meaningful Review, Appeal, and Remedy in Digital Systems

56. Review Pathway

A high-impact digital government system shall provide a clear pathway for affected persons to request review, correction, appeal, or remedy.

57. Contents of Review Pathway

The review pathway shall identify:

  1. how to request review;
  2. who reviews the issue;
  3. timelines;
  4. evidence that may be submitted;
  5. data that may be corrected;
  6. how reasons may be obtained;
  7. what remedies are available;
  8. how urgent harm is addressed;
  9. how systemic error is escalated.

58. Human Review

Where a high-impact digital system materially affects a public decision, an affected person shall have access to meaningful human review.

59. No Automated Denial of Review

A digital government system shall not automatically deny, close, block, suppress, or prevent a review request, appeal, correction request, complaint, or remedy pathway without meaningful human support and lawful authority.

60. Systemic Correction

Where recurring digital-system errors, access failures, data errors, appeal failures, or service exclusions are identified, the responsible authority shall prepare a systemic correction plan.

Part 13 — Service Continuity, Suspension, and Rollback

61. Service Continuity Plan

Every critical digital system shall maintain a service continuity plan.

62. Contents of Service Continuity Plan

A service continuity plan shall identify:

  1. essential services supported;
  2. outage response process;
  3. backup systems;
  4. manual or alternative processes;
  5. public communication;
  6. affected-person notice;
  7. staff roles;
  8. vendor obligations;
  9. data backup and restoration;
  10. appeal continuity;
  11. payment or benefit continuity;
  12. emergency access;
  13. recovery timeline;
  14. post-incident review.

63. Suspension Authority

A responsible authority shall suspend, limit, disconnect, roll back, or deactivate a high-impact digital government system where there are reasonable grounds to believe the system:

  1. lacks lawful authority;
  2. creates serious and uncorrected harm;
  3. blocks access to essential services;
  4. prevents appeal or review;
  5. produces material data error at scale;
  6. lacks auditability;
  7. is insecure;
  8. exposes sensitive data;
  9. prevents public record control;
  10. creates unacceptable vendor dependency;
  11. cannot be operated in compliance with this Act.

64. Emergency Suspension

Where delay would likely create serious harm, the responsible authority may immediately suspend, limit, or disconnect a high-impact digital government system, subject to written reasons and subsequent review.

65. Rollback Plan

Every critical digital system shall maintain a rollback plan identifying:

  1. rollback triggers;
  2. responsible authority;
  3. affected systems;
  4. affected services;
  5. data preservation requirements;
  6. audit-log preservation;
  7. public communication;
  8. alternative service pathways;
  9. vendor obligations;
  10. post-rollback review;
  11. repair sequence;
  12. recommissioning conditions.

66. Decommissioning

A high-impact digital government system shall be decommissioned where repair is not feasible, lawful operation is impossible, or continued operation would create unacceptable risk to rights, public safety, service continuity, public records, cybersecurity, privacy, auditability, or democratic accountability.

Part 14 — Public Digital Systems Register and Dashboard

67. Public Digital Systems Register

The government shall establish and maintain a public register of high-impact digital government systems.

68. Contents of Register

The register shall include:

  1. system name;
  2. responsible authority;
  3. public purpose;
  4. legal authority;
  5. affected population;
  6. services or decisions supported;
  7. high-impact or critical classification;
  8. system owner;
  9. vendor involvement;
  10. data categories used;
  11. AI or automation involvement;
  12. human support pathway;
  13. appeal or correction pathway;
  14. audit status;
  15. privacy review status;
  16. cybersecurity review status;
  17. service continuity status;
  18. exit plan status;
  19. date of last review;
  20. next review date.

69. Public Digital Auditability Dashboard

The government shall maintain a public digital auditability dashboard.

70. Dashboard Indicators

The dashboard shall include indicators for:

  1. number of high-impact digital systems identified;
  2. number of critical digital systems identified;
  3. systems mapped;
  4. systems with data-flow maps;
  5. systems with cybersecurity review completed;
  6. systems with privacy review completed;
  7. systems with public summaries;
  8. systems with digital fallback pathways;
  9. systems with audit-log compliance;
  10. systems with vendor exit plans;
  11. systems with unresolved vendor dependency risks;
  12. systems with service continuity plans;
  13. incidents reported;
  14. systems suspended or decommissioned;
  15. repair actions completed;
  16. upcoming review dates.

71. Citizen-Readable Digital System Summary

Every high-impact digital government system shall have a citizen-readable summary explaining:

  1. what the system does;
  2. who runs it;
  3. who may be affected;
  4. what data categories it uses;
  5. whether AI or automation is involved;
  6. how to access human support;
  7. how to correct data;
  8. how to appeal or request review;
  9. how the system is audited;
  10. how privacy and cybersecurity are reviewed;
  11. what happens if the system fails;
  12. whether there is a non-digital fallback;
  13. when the system will next be reviewed.

Part 15 — Incident Reporting and Corrective Action

72. Incident Reporting Duty

A responsible authority shall report material incidents involving high-impact digital government systems.

73. Reportable Incidents

A reportable incident includes:

  1. service outage affecting essential services;
  2. data breach;
  3. unauthorized access;
  4. data loss;
  5. audit-log failure;
  6. inability to reconstruct a decision;
  7. denial of access caused by digital identity error;
  8. portal failure preventing application, appeal, correction, or review;
  9. vendor failure affecting public accountability or service continuity;
  10. unapproved material system change;
  11. cybersecurity incident;
  12. privacy incident;
  13. automation or workflow error causing material harm;
  14. failure of digital fallback in a high-impact context.

74. Incident Response Plan

A responsible authority shall maintain an incident response plan for every critical digital system.

The plan shall identify:

  1. incident detection process;
  2. responsible officials;
  3. triage process;
  4. affected-person notification;
  5. emergency suspension authority;
  6. service continuity process;
  7. data preservation process;
  8. public communication;
  9. vendor obligations;
  10. post-incident review;
  11. systemic repair process.

75. Public Incident Reporting

Material incidents shall be reported publicly unless disclosure would create a serious and demonstrable risk to national security, cybersecurity, privacy, law enforcement, personal safety, or lawful confidentiality.

Where full disclosure is restricted, the responsible authority shall publish the highest safe level of public explanation.

Part 16 — Independent Review, Red-Team Testing, and Public Challenge

76. Independent Review

A critical digital government system shall be subject to independent review by persons with appropriate expertise in law, public administration, systems engineering, data governance, cybersecurity, privacy, accessibility, procurement, public records, audit, and the affected domain.

77. Red-Team Review

A critical digital system shall be subject to red-team review.

The review shall ask:

  1. how the system could fail;
  2. how the system could exclude affected persons;
  3. how the system could hide error;
  4. how the system could block appeal;
  5. how the system could expose data;
  6. how vendor dependency could weaken public control;
  7. how audit logs could fail;
  8. how public records could become inaccessible;
  9. how a cyber incident could disrupt service;
  10. how rollback could fail;
  11. how the system could resist correction.

78. Public Challenge Process

The responsible authority shall establish a process through which affected persons, civil society, journalists, public servants, auditors, experts, Indigenous governments, public bodies, and other affected parties may submit evidence of digital-system failure, access exclusion, data error, auditability gap, privacy risk, cybersecurity risk, vendor dependency risk, or service-continuity failure.

Part 17 — Security, Confidentiality, and Bounded Accountability

79. Protected Information

Nothing in this Act requires public disclosure of information where disclosure would create a serious and demonstrable risk to national security, cybersecurity, privacy, law enforcement, personal safety, or lawful confidentiality.

80. Bounded Accountability

Where information cannot be made public, the responsible authority shall provide:

  1. a public summary at the highest safe level of abstraction;
  2. a restricted record for authorized reviewers;
  3. audit access sufficient to verify legality, accountability, and compliance;
  4. written reasons for withholding public disclosure.

81. No Secrecy Without Review

Confidentiality shall not eliminate the requirement for authorized audit, legal review, privacy review, cybersecurity review, public records review, appeal review, oversight, or accountability.

Part 18 — Oversight, Compliance, and Remedies

82. Oversight Body

An authorized oversight body shall monitor compliance with this Act.

The oversight body may be established by regulation or assigned to an existing public authority with appropriate independence, expertise, and legal powers.

83. Powers of Oversight Body

The oversight body may:

  1. require records;
  2. inspect digital systems;
  3. review system maps;
  4. require data-flow maps;
  5. inspect audit logs;
  6. investigate incidents;
  7. review vendor contracts;
  8. require privacy or cybersecurity review;
  9. require service continuity plans;
  10. order corrective action;
  11. order suspension of unsafe systems;
  12. receive public complaints;
  13. refer matters to tribunals, courts, auditors, privacy commissioners, cybersecurity authorities, procurement authorities, human rights bodies, or law enforcement where appropriate.

84. Compliance Orders

The oversight body may issue a compliance order requiring a responsible authority to:

  1. prepare or update a system map;
  2. prepare or update a data-flow map;
  3. publish a citizen-readable summary;
  4. establish digital fallback;
  5. repair an access failure;
  6. repair an appeal or correction gap;
  7. preserve audit logs;
  8. conduct cybersecurity review;
  9. conduct privacy review;
  10. update vendor contracts;
  11. prepare an exit plan;
  12. prepare a service continuity plan;
  13. suspend unsafe deployment;
  14. report on repair progress.

85. Individual Remedy

Where an affected person suffers material harm due to failure to provide access, human support, data correction, reasons, appeal, auditability, privacy protection, lawful process, or digital fallback required by this Act, the affected person may seek remedy through the applicable review, appeal, tribunal, court, ombuds, privacy, human rights, administrative, or oversight process.

86. Systemic Correction Orders

Where recurring digital-system errors, access failures, exclusion patterns, data errors, cybersecurity weaknesses, privacy failures, audit gaps, vendor failures, or appeal failures are identified, the oversight body may require a systemic correction plan.

87. Whistleblower Protection

No person shall suffer retaliation for reporting a digital systems integrity failure, cybersecurity risk, privacy risk, unsafe deployment, vendor concealment, auditability gap, access failure, data error, or serious public-system risk in good faith.

Part 19 — Regulations

88. Regulations

The Governor in Council may make regulations:

  1. prescribing high-impact digital government systems;
  2. prescribing critical digital systems;
  3. establishing system mapping standards;
  4. establishing data-flow mapping standards;
  5. establishing audit-log requirements;
  6. establishing cybersecurity review requirements;
  7. establishing privacy review requirements;
  8. establishing vendor contract requirements;
  9. establishing service continuity requirements;
  10. establishing digital fallback requirements;
  11. establishing public register requirements;
  12. establishing dashboard indicators;
  13. establishing incident reporting thresholds;
  14. establishing retention periods;
  15. establishing phased implementation timelines;
  16. exempting systems where equivalent or stronger protections exist.

89. No Regulation May Defeat Purpose

No regulation made under this Act shall defeat the purpose of ensuring lawful, mapped, auditable, secure, private, accessible, exit-capable, citizen-legible, and democratically correctable digital government systems.

Part 20 — Statutory Review, Pilot Phase, and Coming into Force

90. Statutory Review

A committee of Parliament shall review this Act within three years after coming into force and every five years thereafter.

The review shall examine:

  1. whether the Act improves visibility of digital government systems;
  2. whether it improves auditability;
  3. whether it improves appeal, correction, and remedy;
  4. whether it improves accessibility and digital fallback;
  5. whether it improves privacy and cybersecurity governance;
  6. whether it reduces vendor lock-in;
  7. whether it improves public record control;
  8. whether it creates unnecessary bureaucracy;
  9. whether amendments are required.

91. Pilot Phase

This Act shall be implemented through a pilot phase applying first to prescribed high-impact digital systems, including:

  1. digital identity systems;
  2. public benefit portals;
  3. immigration or status portals;
  4. housing, permitting, or licensing portals;
  5. public data-sharing systems;
  6. case-management systems affecting rights, benefits, or enforcement;
  7. cloud-hosted high-impact public systems;
  8. procurement or grant-management systems;
  9. emergency-response digital systems;
  10. public AI or automated decision-support systems.

92. Coming into Force

This Act comes into force on a day fixed by order of the Governor in Council.

Different provisions may come into force on different days.

Schedule A — Digital System Auditability Assessment Template

A digital system auditability assessment shall include:

  1. system name;
  2. responsible authority;
  3. public purpose;
  4. legal authority;
  5. affected population;
  6. high-impact or critical classification;
  7. system map;
  8. data-flow map;
  9. vendor map;
  10. public record control review;
  11. privacy review;
  12. cybersecurity review;
  13. accessibility review;
  14. digital fallback review;
  15. case-management and workflow review;
  16. AI or automation exposure;
  17. audit-log design;
  18. appeal and correction pathway;
  19. service continuity plan;
  20. exit plan;
  21. failure-mode register;
  22. citizen-readable summary;
  23. repair sequence.

Schedule B — Digital Stack Visibility Checklist

A high-impact digital government system shall identify:

  1. the legal authority;
  2. the public purpose;
  3. the responsible authority;
  4. the accountable officials;
  5. the public service or decision supported;
  6. the portal or interface used;
  7. the database or records system used;
  8. the identity or authentication layer used;
  9. the case-management system used;
  10. the cloud or hosting infrastructure used;
  11. the vendor platform used;
  12. the data flows;
  13. the automation or AI components;
  14. the audit logs;
  15. the human support pathway;
  16. the appeal or correction pathway;
  17. the service continuity plan;
  18. the exit plan.

Schedule C — Citizen-Readable Digital System Summary

A citizen-readable digital system summary shall answer:

  1. What does this digital system do?
  2. Which public authority is responsible?
  3. Who can be affected?
  4. What law authorizes it?
  5. What public services or decisions does it support?
  6. What data categories does it use?
  7. Does it share data with other systems?
  8. Does it use AI or automation?
  9. Does it use a vendor platform?
  10. How can I get human support?
  11. How can I correct wrong data?
  12. How can I appeal or request review?
  13. How is the system audited?
  14. How are privacy and cybersecurity protected?
  15. Is there a non-digital fallback?
  16. What happens if the system fails?
  17. Can the system be paused, replaced, or exited?

Schedule D — Digital Failure Mode Register

A digital failure-mode register shall identify:

  1. failure mode;
  2. affected population;
  3. triggering condition;
  4. likely harm;
  5. severity;
  6. probability;
  7. detectability;
  8. responsible authority;
  9. existing control;
  10. missing control;
  11. repair action;
  12. deadline;
  13. status;
  14. review date.

Failure modes may include:

  1. portal outage;
  2. identity mismatch;
  3. account lockout;
  4. data-sharing error;
  5. data loss;
  6. audit-log failure;
  7. vendor access failure;
  8. cybersecurity breach;
  9. privacy breach;
  10. appeal blockage;
  11. correction failure;
  12. inaccessible interface;
  13. digital fallback failure;
  14. workflow misrouting;
  15. dashboard metric distortion;
  16. vendor lock-in;
  17. inability to export records;
  18. inability to decommission system.

Schedule E — Vendor Digital Integrity Requirements

A vendor supporting a high-impact digital government system shall provide:

  1. documentation sufficient for audit;
  2. access to relevant logs;
  3. configuration documentation;
  4. change notification;
  5. cybersecurity cooperation;
  6. privacy compliance;
  7. incident reporting;
  8. data portability;
  9. interoperability;
  10. public records compliance;
  11. subcontractor disclosure;
  12. service continuity support;
  13. decommissioning support;
  14. exit transition assistance;
  15. support for appeal and correction pathways;
  16. compliance with this Act.

Schedule F — Service Continuity Minimum Requirements

A service continuity plan for a critical digital system shall include:

  1. essential services supported;
  2. continuity owner;
  3. outage triggers;
  4. cyber incident triggers;
  5. vendor failure triggers;
  6. alternative service pathway;
  7. non-digital fallback;
  8. staff escalation process;
  9. public communication process;
  10. affected-person notice;
  11. data backup;
  12. audit-log preservation;
  13. recovery timeline;
  14. post-incident review;
  15. repair sequence.

Final Standard

The Digital Government Auditability Act exists to make the digital stack of government visible before it becomes unavoidable.

It does not prevent digital modernization.

It prevents invisible public power.

A public digital system should not govern citizens unless citizens can understand how to access it, challenge it, correct it, and escape harm from its failure.

A public authority should not buy systems it cannot audit.

It should not depend on platforms it cannot exit.

It should not digitize rights into dead ends.

It should not make public power faster while making accountability weaker.

The standard is simple:

Digital government must remain visible, auditable, correctable, accessible, and under public control.

 

 

Project Page: AI Does Not Fix Government. It Amplifies It (Part 1) https://x.com/SkillsGapTrain/status/2065348053645861271

Disclaimer: This is an open-source educational system that is being developed for learning, research, frontier systems engineering and prototyping, intended to help students, teachers, public-sector builders, policy analysts, political leaders, corporate leaders and responsible organizations explore next-generation governance systems for humanity; it is not legal advice, policy authority, certification, or deployment-ready public infrastructure. Executive Summary of Audit of current development status is located at bottom of Part 3 of Project Page.

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