The Great North American Split: How Immigration Rewrote the Canada–U.S. Cultural Compact

Abstract

This paper investigates whether accelerated demographic and cultural changes in Canadian immigration policy – particularly under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau, Justin Trudeau, and the so-called Laurentian elite – have shifted Canada away from cultural alignment with the United States.

Using a comparative historical approach, we examine immigration trends since the 1970s with a focus on the 2015 – 2025 period (especially post-2020). We analyze whether Canada’s immigrant intake has moved from predominantly Latin American, European, and U.S.-aligned sources to a disproportionately non-Western, non-Christian profile, and compare this shift to concurrent U.S. immigration patterns.

We further explore changes in immigration policy filters (religious, philosophical, cultural) and assess if Canada’s immigrant population is now culturally or spiritually distinct from America’s.

Finally, we evaluate whether this demographic and cultural divergence correlates with increased bilateral tensions or strategic drift between Canada and the U.S., particularly during the Trump presidency.

Our findings show that Canada’s immigration since the 1970s – bolstered by multiculturalism and a skills-based selection system – has indeed tilted toward Asia, Africa and other non-Western regions, markedly reducing the share of European and Christian-origin newcomers (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca) (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity).

In contrast, U.S. immigration, while also diversifying, continues to include a larger proportion of Western-hemisphere (Latin American) migrants and Christian-affiliated immigrants (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report) (Religions of immigrants | EBSCO Research Starters).

Canadian policy shifts (from Pierre Trudeau’s 1971 multiculturalism policy to Justin Trudeau’s post-2015 openness) appear to have fostered a more pluralistic immigrant demographic, whereas U.S. policies (including restrictive measures in 2017 – 2020) have followed a different trajectory.

There is evidence that these differences have coincided with moments of Canada – U.S. friction – most notably during Donald Trump’s presidency – as Canada’s globalist, diversity-embracing stance diverged from U.S. nationalist and security-driven approaches (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

We conclude that accelerated immigration-driven demographic changes have contributed to a measurable cultural divergence between Canada and the U.S., though the extent of strategic misalignment remains subject to broader political and economic factors.

Introduction

Canada and the United States have long been close allies with deeply intertwined histories, economies, and cultures. For much of their history, both countries derived their national character from a predominantly Western cultural inheritance, with English (and in Canada, French) European roots and Christian religious traditions.

In the post-World War II era, Canada and the U.S. were largely aligned in values and demographics: both were majority-Christian nations and both received many immigrants from Europe or other parts of the Western world.

However, in recent decades – especially since the late 20th century – Canada’s approach to immigration and national identity has evolved in ways that may be setting it apart from its southern neighbour (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations) (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

This paper examines the theory that accelerated demographic and cultural changes in Canadian immigration policy have shifted Canada away from cultural alignment with the United States. In particular, we scrutinize the periods of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the 1970s and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in the late 2010s to early 2020s, along with the influence of Canada’s central policy-making elite (often dubbed the Laurentian elite), to see how immigration trends and policies under their leadership compare to those in the United States.

We address five interrelated questions:

(1) Has Canadian immigration since the 1970s – and especially in the 2015–2025 period – moved away from immigrants of predominantly Latin American, European, or U.S.-aligned origin toward a disproportionately non-Western and non-Christian intake?

(2) How do Canada’s immigration patterns in this regard compare with U.S. immigration trends over the same period, and has a divergence occurred in the types of immigrants each country attracts?

(3) Have Canadian immigration policies changed their “filtering” mechanisms for religion, culture, or ideology such that Canada’s immigrant population today is culturally and spiritually different from that of the U.S.?

(4) Has this demographic and cultural divergence between the two countries correlated with greater bilateral tensions or a strategic drift, particularly during the Trump era when U.S. nationalism was ascendant?

(5) How do historical policy decisions from Pierre Trudeau’s introduction of official multiculturalism to Justin Trudeau’s contemporary policies (and the perspectives of elite figures like Mark Carney) inform this analysis?

By exploring these questions, the paper aims to test the hypothesis that Canada’s rapid immigration-driven demographic changes have indeed altered its cultural alignment with the United States.

The Introduction provides background and outlines the issues. The Literature Review summarizes key historical developments and scholarly perspectives on Canadian and U.S. immigration models. The Methodology section explains the data sources and comparative approach used. In Findings, we present statistical evidence and historical documentation addressing each question. The Discussion interprets the findings in the context of Canada–U.S. relations and domestic politics. Finally, the Conclusion offers an assessment of the theory and its implications, along with suggestions for further research.

Literature Review

Canadian Immigration Policy and Demographics since the 1970s: In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Canada fundamentally reformed its immigration system in ways that set the stage for a more diverse intake. A crucial change was the introduction of a universal, points-based selection system in 1967, which eliminated ethnic and national origin quotas in favour of evaluating applicants on skills and other criteria (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

This reform, alongside the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy enunciated by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, represented an official embrace of cultural diversity as a cornerstone of Canadian identity (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Indeed, legislation in 1976 codified Canada’s commitment to humanitarian immigration (refugee resettlement) and framed immigration as a tool to meet Canada’s cultural, economic, and social objectives (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Scholars note that during this era Canadians were actively seeking a new national cohesion “that was not British and not American,” one which could accommodate Canada’s bilingual (English-French) heritage and increasing ethnocultural diversity (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations) (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

The concept of the Canadian mosaic (a multicultural mix) emerged in contrast to the American melting pot, signalling an ideological divergence: Canada would encourage immigrants to retain their cultural identities within a pluralistic society, whereas the U.S. traditionally expected assimilation into an Anglo-American identity.

The impact of these policy changes on demographics was immediate. By the late 1970s and 1980s, immigration from non-European sources had increased markedly (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Historical analyses show that up until 1971, the vast majority of Canada’s immigrants came from Europe (over 79% of the foreign-born in 1971 were born in Europe, including the U.K.) (150 years of immigration in Canada).

But from the 1970s onward, immigration from Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Africa grew substantially, aided by the removal of racially biased selection and by global geopolitical events (e.g. Indochinese refugees in the late 1970s) (150 years of immigration in Canada).

By the 1990s and 2000s, immigrants from China, India, the Philippines and other Asian countries dominated Canada’s intake, even surpassing traditional European sources in the census data (150 years of immigration in Canada). Irene Bloemraad (2012) characterizes this openness and diversity as “Canadian exceptionalism,” noting that Canada by the 21st century had the highest immigrant-to-population ratio in the West (over 20%) yet maintained generally positive public attitudes toward immigration (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library) (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

Reasons cited include Canada’s geography (insulating it from mass unauthorized migration), the effectiveness of the points system in selecting immigrants who integrate economically, and the political importance of immigrant communities in Canadian elections (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

Crucially, multiculturalism as a marker of national identity has been deliberately fostered by Canada’s leaders, making diversity itself a source of pride and consensus (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

U.S. Immigration Policy and Trends: The United States also underwent an immigration policy overhaul in 1965 (the Hart-Celler Act), ending national-origins quotas and opening the door to immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere.

In contrast to Canada’s skills-based approach, the U.S. system prioritized family reunification and maintained per-country limits, which, combined with geographic proximity, led to very different demographics.

Through the late 20th century, U.S. immigration became heavily weighted toward Latin America (especially Mexico and Central America) and, to a lesser extent, Asia. While the U.S. certainly grew more diverse, it did not adopt an official policy of multiculturalism; rather, the expectation (at least rhetorically) was that newcomers would assimilate to an American civic identity.

By the 2000s, about 13–14% of the U.S. population was foreign-born – a lower proportion than in Canada (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library) – and public opinion in the U.S. toward immigration was more divided, with greater concerns about illegal immigration and cultural change.

Some literature emphasizes that Americans and Canadians “do immigration differently” (Michael Cuenco, Blake Smith, Author at American Affairs Journal).

Michael Cuenco (2021) notes that Canada’s system is often seen as more merit-based and selective, whereas the U.S. has faced challenges with irregular migration and political backlash, making immigration a more polarizing issue in American politics (e.g. the rise of hardline rhetoric during the Trump era) (The Canadian Ideology – American Affairs Journal) (The Canadian Ideology – American Affairs Journal).

Despite these differences, both countries experienced growing immigrant diversity by the 2010s. Researchers like Jeffrey Reitz and Daniel Hiebert have examined whether Canada and the U.S. are converging or diverging in terms of integration outcomes and attitudes. A key point of divergence noted in the literature is religion: Canada has become significantly more religiously plural due to immigration, while the U.S. immigrant population, though also diverse, includes a large proportion of Christians (especially Catholics from Latin America).

A Canadian Press analysis in 2013 pointed out that among recent immigrants to Canada, the share identifying as Christian had plummeted from 78% in 1971 to about 47.5% by 2011 (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca).

In contrast, the Pew Research Center and others have found that a large majority of U.S. immigrants have historically been Christian (on the order of 70% in 2010) (Religious background of U.S. immigrants 2020 | Statista), although this too has been declining in the last decade as more immigrants of other faiths (and secular backgrounds) arrive (Religions of immigrants | EBSCO Research Starters).

The Laurentian Elite and Policy Direction: The term Laurentian elite refers to Canada’s Eastern establishment – political, business, and intellectual leaders centered in Ontario and Quebec – who have largely shaped national policies since Confederation. Analysts like John Ibbitson and Darryl Bricker (who popularized the term in Canadian discourse) argue that this elite consensus favoured a strong central government, bilingualism, high immigration, and multiculturalism as strategies to build the nation (and also to maintain influence). Under Pierre Trudeau’s leadership (1968–1984, apart from a brief interruption) this vision was clearly articulated: bilingualism and multiculturalism were enshrined, and immigration from non-traditional sources was welcomed as part of Canada’s identity project (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Decades later, under Justin Trudeau (2015–present), we see continuity in this approach. Justin Trudeau’s government not only increased immigration targets (reaching historic highs by the early 2020s) but also made symbolic statements like “Diversity is our strength,” reinforcing the multicultural ethos.

Some commentators suggest that these policies intentionally distinguish Canada from the United States. For example, whereas U.S. politics in the late 2010s featured a backlash against globalization and immigration (exemplified by Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda), Canada under the Laurentian consensus doubled down on openness – taking in Syrian refugees when the U.S. cut its refugee admissions, advocating for globalization, and courting immigration to fuel economic growth (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

However, criticism exists. Voices on the populist right in Canada (e.g. the People’s Party) have questioned high immigration and its impact on Canadian culture and housing, though with limited electoral success (The Canadian Ideology – American Affairs Journal).

Others have cynically argued (as in a 2023 UnHerd article by Cuenco) that Canadian elites use mass immigration for economic goals (like boosting real estate demand) rather than purely for multicultural idealism (Canada’s cynical immigration racket – UnHerd) (Canada’s cynical immigration racket – UnHerd). Nonetheless, mainstream Canadian policy remains committed to immigration as a positive force, and negative reactions are more muted than in the U.S. – a phenomenon documented in comparative studies (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library) (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

Canada–U.S. Relations and Cultural Drift: A body of literature in political science has examined whether Canada–U.S. relations are marked by convergence or divergence over time. Traditionally, despite differences, the two countries have been seen as aligning on core values (democracy, individual rights, market economics).

Yet, some scholars (and policymakers like former Canadian diplomats) have observed a gradual drift in recent years, especially on social issues and foreign policy outlooks. The Trump presidency (2017–2021) in particular is often cited as a stress test for the relationship: Canada’s liberal internationalist stance clashed with Trump’s nationalism on issues ranging from trade to climate change to immigration.

During this period, there were unusual public spats – for example, Trump’s imposition of tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, and his personal insults toward Justin Trudeau in 2018 – that highlighted a values gap.

Mark Carney, a prominent Canadian economist and former central banker (and an influential figure among Canadian and global elites), remarked that Trump’s America signalled an end to an era of easy cooperation.

In a hypothetical scenario described by media in 2025, Carney (imagined as Prime Minister) even declared that the old, integrated relationship with the U.S. was “over” due to America’s turn toward protectionism and unilateralism (End of an era for Canada-US ties, says Carney, as allies worldwide decry Trump’s car tariffs | Trump tariffs | The Guardian) (Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy | Reuters).

While that scenario was speculative, it reflects real concerns voiced by Canadian leaders: for instance, Justin Trudeau often reiterated Canada’s differing view on immigration during Trump’s travel ban controversy (2017), emphasizing that Canada would remain open to refugees regardless of U.S. policy. Strategic analysts have debated whether demographic changes (such as Canada’s growing Asian diasporas or more secular society) might tilt Canada’s policy priorities away from alignment with an increasingly polarized U.S.

In summary, prior research and commentary suggest that:

(a) Canada’s immigration profile has shifted dramatically toward non-Western sources since the 1970s;

(b) the U.S. profile has also changed but remains distinct;

(c) Canada’s policy framework consciously embraces diversity, whereas U.S. policy has been more conflicted; and

(d) these differences potentially contribute to divergent worldviews, which could strain Canada–U.S. alignment.

Building on this literature, our study will provide updated evidence from the 2015–2025 period and directly test the idea of cultural and strategic divergence stemming from immigration-driven demographic change.

Methodology

To investigate these questions, we employ a mixed-methods historical comparative analysis.

Data Collection: We gathered quantitative data on immigration intake for Canada and the United States from the 1970s through the 2020s.

For Canada, key sources include Statistics Canada census data (particularly the 2016 and 2021 Census results) and annual immigration reports, which detail the number of permanent residents admitted and their countries of origin. We also incorporate figures from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) on recent admissions (e.g. 2015–2022) to capture the post-2015 trends.

For the United States, we use U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Yearbook of Immigration Statistics and Annual Flow Reports (especially the 2022 report for recent trends (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report)), along with research by the Pew Research Center and Migration Policy Institute summarizing immigrant demographics.

In addition, we collected data on the religious composition of immigrants (from sources like Statistics Canada’s 2021 census release on religion and immigration (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity), and Pew’s studies on the religious affiliation of U.S. immigrants (The Religious Affiliation of U.S. Immigrants: Majority Christian …)).

Comparative Framework: We structured the comparison around the proportion of immigrants coming from Western-aligned regions (e.g. Europe, the United States itself, and Latin America) versus non-Western regions (Asia, Africa, Middle East) for each country over time. We specifically highlight the share of immigrants who are from predominantly Christian vs. non-Christian cultures as a proxy for cultural alignment. This approach operationalizes “cultural alignment” partly in terms of heritage and religion (recognizing that these are imperfect measures, but relevant to the hypothesis given the focus on Western/Christian vs. non-Western/non-Christian intake).

Policy Analysis: We qualitatively analyze policy documents and announcements – for example, Canada’s 1971 Multiculturalism Policy, the 1976 Immigration Act, and contemporary policy statements like Canada’s Immigration Levels Plan (2015–2025) – to understand the intended goals of immigration policy. For the U.S., we review major policy shifts such as the Immigration Act of 1965, and more recent executive actions (e.g. the 2017 travel ban and changes in refugee admissions under Trump, and subsequent reversals under Biden). We examine whether these policies included explicit or implicit cultural/ideological filters and how they affected immigrant streams.

Bilateral Relations Context: To assess correlations with Canada–U.S. relations, we conduct a timeline analysis focusing on 2015–2025. We note key events that might indicate tension or drift (e.g. the 2018 G7 quarrel, trade disputes, cross-border migration issues) and consider whether they coincided with or were exacerbated by differing immigration and demographic realities. Speeches and statements by leaders (Justin Trudeau, Donald Trump, and others like Mark Carney) are used as qualitative evidence of perceptions of divergence (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations) (Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy | Reuters).

Analysis: The data and evidence are then analyzed to see if they support or refute the theory. We look for

(a) a clear trend in Canada’s immigrant composition shifting relative to the U.S.,

(b) differences in cultural characteristics of immigrant populations, and

(c) any alignment between those differences and policy frictions.

The analysis remains mindful of confounding factors. For instance, cultural divergence could result from domestic social evolution unrelated to immigration (e.g. secularization trends, indigenous reconciliation, etc.), and political tensions can arise from personal or economic disagreements aside from culture. We attempt to isolate immigration’s role by focusing on metrics and events most directly tied to immigrant demographics or immigration policy.

In sum, our methodology combines quantitative data comparison (Canada vs. U.S. immigration metrics) with qualitative policy and discourse analysis, set against the backdrop of historical process-tracing in Canada–U.S. relations. This approach allows us to rigorously test the proposed theory with evidence from multiple angles. All data sources are cited in-text with references, and a full reference list is provided in the References section. The following sections present the results of this research.

Findings

Shift in Canadian Immigration since the 1970s – Rise of Non-Western, Non-Christian Intake

Historical Composition Changes: The data strongly indicate that Canada’s immigrant inflows have shifted from a predominantly Western origin profile in the mid-20th century to a largely non-Western profile in recent decades. In 1971, the vast majority of Canada’s foreign-born population had been born in Europe or the United States. As noted in historical census analysis, 79.7% of immigrants in Canada in 1971 were born in Europe (28.3% from the United Kingdom alone, plus 51.4% from other European countries) (150 years of immigration in Canada).

Only a small fraction at that time came from Asia, Africa, or other regions. Consequently, most immigrants during Canada’s early postwar period were of Christian heritage (primarily Catholics and Protestants), reflecting the European and American origins. For example, an analysis by Statistics Canada shows that in 1971 about 78% of recent immigrants identified as Christian (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca). This aligns with the origin countries being largely Christian-majority (Europe, USA, Latin America).

Fast-forward to the present, and the picture is markedly different. Since the 1970s, the share of new immigrants coming from Europe has steadily declined, replaced by immigrants from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians).

By 2011, Asia had become the top source continent of Canada’s immigrants (150 years of immigration in Canada). The 2011 National Household Survey (NHS) confirmed a watershed moment: for the first time in Canada’s history, the most common countries of birth for the foreign-born were not European – China and India surpassed the U.K. as the leading immigrant source countries (150 years of immigration in Canada).

This trend continued into the 2020s. According to the 2021 Canadian Census, Asia (including the Middle East) now accounts for the majority of recent immigrants, while Europe’s share has dwindled to a small percentage (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians). Africa’s contribution has also risen, though not as dramatically as Asia’s (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians).

Concrete recent statistics illustrate this shift. In 2022, Canada admitted a record number of new permanent residents (over 437,000). The top five source countries in 2022 were India, China, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the Philippines, in that order (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Notably absent from the top sources were any Western countries: none of the top five were European or Latin American (the Philippines, while culturally having a Western influence and predominantly Catholic, is an Asian country by region).

India and China alone constituted a large portion – for instance, India has in recent years accounted for roughly one-third of Canada’s annual immigrants, a striking change from decades past.

These countries of origin imply a far more varied cultural and religious mix among newcomers. India contributes immigrants who are Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, Christian, or of other faiths; China’s immigrants might be culturally Chinese with diverse beliefs (Buddhist, folk religion, Christian, or non-religious); Afghanistan’s and Nigeria’s immigrants add substantial Muslim (and in Nigeria’s case, also Christian) communities; the Philippines brings mostly Catholic and some Protestant immigrants. This contrasts sharply with the largely Christian European influx of earlier eras.

Religious Composition: As a result of these origin shifts, the religious profile of Canada’s immigrant population has diversified significantly. By the 2010s, less than half of recent immigrants were Christian. Statistics Canada reported that among immigrants admitted between 2011 and 2021, only about 52% were affiliated with Christianity, while nearly 19% were Muslim, 9% Hindu, 5.8% Sikh, and others Buddhist or of no religious affiliation (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity).

In other words, a majority (roughly 48%+) of newcomers in that period belonged to non-Christian faiths or had no religion, a radical change from 50 years ago. Indeed, immigrants are now the primary driver of non-Christian religious growth in Canada – they represent 63% of Canada’s Muslim population, 69% of Buddhists, 63% of Hindus, and 54% of Sikhs nationally (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity).

The declining share of Christian immigrants (down to ~47.5% by 2011 as noted, and hovering around or below the 50% mark in the 2020s) signifies that Canada’s intake is no longer predominantly rooted in the Judeo-Christian cultural sphere (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca).

Meanwhile, Canadian society as a whole has become more secular and pluralistic – about 26% of Canada’s total population in 2021 reported no religious affiliation, and only 53% identified as Christian (a drop from 67% twenty years earlier) (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca).

Immigration has contributed to both trends: bolstering non-Christian groups and, through diversity, possibly diluting the dominance of any single religious tradition. This stands in contrast to the United States (as we will see below), where immigrants have reinforced the Christian majority to a greater extent. In sum, the evidence confirms that Canadian immigration since the 1970s has shifted toward disproportionately non-Western and non-Christian sources, especially in the past decade. The hypothesis in question is strongly supported on this front: Canada’s immigrant demographics have indeed undergone an accelerated transformation under the policy regimes established by leaders like Pierre Trudeau and continued by Justin Trudeau’s government.

Comparison with U.S. Immigration Trends (1970s–2020s) and Divergence in Profiles

To determine if a divergence has occurred between Canada and the United States in terms of immigrant origins, we compare the composition trends in both countries. The United States also liberalized its immigration policies in the 1960s (ending European-origin quotas), resulting in greater diversity. However, the patterns of source regions differed due to factors like geographic proximity, policy preferences, and historical ties.

Origins of U.S. Immigrants: In the decades after 1970, the largest source of U.S. immigrants (especially unauthorized and many legal immigrants via family reunification) became Latin America. Mexico, in particular, has been the single largest country of origin of U.S. immigrants for roughly the last half-century. For example, as of the 2010s, there were over 11 million Mexican-born residents in the U.S. – by far the highest from any country (Who’s Receiving U.S. Green Cards, by Country of Origin).

Even among those obtaining legal permanent residency (green cards), Mexico has consistently topped the list. U.S. Department of Homeland Security data for recent years underscores this: in Fiscal Year 2022, Mexico was again the leading country of birth for new U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs) (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report). Mexico was followed by India and China (which have grown as significant sources for the U.S. through skilled worker visas and family reunification), but then the next largest groups were from the Dominican Republic, Cuba, the Philippines, and Vietnam (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report).

The presence of three Latin-origin countries in the top five (Mexico, Dominican Republic, Cuba) for U.S. immigrants in 2022 shows the continued importance of Western Hemisphere migration to America (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report).

By region, about 40–50% of U.S. immigrants in recent decades have come from Latin America and the Caribbean, roughly 30–40% from Asia, and a much smaller fraction from Europe or Africa (Africa’s share in the U.S. has been rising slowly, but from a low base around 5–8%) (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report).

When comparing, we see a clear divergence: Canada’s immigrant pool is weighted far more towards Asia and Africa, whereas the United States’ includes a large proportion from Latin America. For instance, Canada’s intake from Europe plus the Americas (combined) is now well under 25% of newcomers, with Asia and Africa comprising the bulk (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

The U.S., however, still receives a substantial share (often majority) of its immigrants from the Americas (primarily Latin America). This means many U.S. immigrants come from countries that are geographically and culturally in the Western sphere (Christian-majority nations in Latin America).

Canada, lacking a land border with any country except the U.S., has relatively few immigrants from Latin America by comparison. Even within the 2015–2025 focus period, this holds: Canada’s push to increase immigration saw more Indians, Chinese, Syrians, Nigerians, Iranians, etc., whereas the U.S. in the late 2010s saw continued arrivals (legal and irregular) from Mexico, Central America (e.g., a surge of asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle), along with Indians, Chinese and others through employment visas.

Religious and Cultural Composition in the U.S.: Given these origins, the cultural makeup of U.S. immigrants has diverged from that of Canada’s immigrants. Latin American immigrants are overwhelmingly Christian (mostly Roman Catholic). Thus, they bolstered the Christian share of the U.S. immigrant population. As of 2020, it was estimated that about 70% of immigrants living in the U.S. identified as Christian, a figure significantly higher than the equivalent in Canada (Religious background of U.S. immigrants 2020 | Statista).

Even with diversification, recent trends show a gradual shift: by the early 2020s, the Christian share among new U.S. immigrants had fallen to around 55% (indicating more Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and non-religious immigrants arriving than before) (Religions of immigrants | EBSCO Research Starters).

However, this 55% is still a majority. In contrast, we saw that recent Canadian cohorts are minority Christian. Moreover, Muslim and Hindu immigrants constitute a larger fraction of newcomers in Canada than in the U.S.: In the 2011–2021 period, roughly 19% of Canadian newcomers were Muslim and 9% Hindu (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity).

For the U.S., an analysis in 2020 found that immigrants of Muslim and Hindu faith together made up about 32% of recent immigrants (Religions of immigrants | EBSCO Research Starters) – somewhat lower in Muslim proportion but higher in Hindu than Canada’s figures, owing to India being a big source for both. Still, because the U.S. has so many Christian Latinos, the relative impact of non-Christian immigration is diluted.

Another way to compare: In Canada, by 2021 about 5% of the total population was Muslim (Islam is the second-largest religion) (Nearly a quarter of the Canadian population were immigrants in 2021), largely due to immigration.

In the U.S., Muslims are roughly 1–2% of the population. Similarly, Sikhs form about 2% of Canada’s population (and significantly higher percentages in some regions like Metro Vancouver), whereas in the U.S. Sikhs are a much smaller community nationally. These differences speak to the distinct immigrant streams: Canada has attracted more immigrants from South Asia (India, Pakistan) in proportion to its size, and more refugees from places like the Middle East and Africa (Somalia, Syria, etc.), compared to the U.S. which has taken more from Latin America and the Caribbean.

Policy Divergence Reflected in Numbers: Part of the divergence can be traced to policy and geography. Canada’s points system has actively recruited skilled workers from Asia and Africa, and Canada has also been more generous (per capita) in refugee resettlement of people from conflict zones in Asia/Africa (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

For example, during the Syrian refugee crisis (2015–2016), Canada resettled over 40,000 Syrian refugees, whereas the U.S. (with a much larger population) admitted a smaller number and then effectively halted Syrian admissions under Trump. On the other hand, the U.S.’s sheer proximity to Latin America means it naturally receives more migrants from that region, whether through legal channels or irregular migration. There is no equivalent for Canada (very few people trek from Latin America to Canada without passing through the U.S.). Thus Canada’s immigrant intake is sourced globally (with an emphasis on Asia/Africa) while America’s is weighted toward its hemisphere.

In summary, Canada and the U.S. have indeed developed divergent immigration profiles. Both countries are ethnically more diverse now than in 1970, but Canada’s diversity skews toward non-Western cultures to a greater degree. By the 2020s, we can observe that Canada’s foreign-born population has a substantially different makeup than America’s.

This finding supports the idea of a demographic divergence: Canada’s immigration policy outcomes have created a populace that is less U.S.-aligned in cultural heritage (if one defines U.S.-aligned loosely as originating from similar sources or sharing similar religious traditions). The divergence is not absolute – for instance, both countries have large Indian and Chinese diaspora communities – but the relative differences (Canada’s paucity of Latin American immigrants and majority of Asian/African immigrants, versus the U.S.’s huge Latin American contingent) are striking.

Changes in Immigration Policy Filters and Cultural Screening

Canadian Policy Evolution: One aspect of our inquiry is whether Canadian immigration policy altered its “filtering mechanisms” for religion, culture, or philosophy in recent decades, thereby producing a different kind of immigrant population than the United States. The evidence suggests that Canada’s selection criteria have been officially “blind” to religion and culture since the points system was adopted, focusing on economic factors, education, language ability, and family reunification. This means there was no formal religious or ethnic filtering – a dramatic break from the pre-1960s era when Canada had preferences for European (and Christian) immigrants.

In fact, the embrace of multiculturalism in 1971 explicitly positioned Canada as receptive to all cultures (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations). Pierre Trudeau’s vision was that no singular cultural model (British or French or otherwise) would define a Canadian – instead, Canadian identity would be bound by civic values (e.g. bilingualism, democracy) while allowing diverse cultural expression. This ethos has permeated immigration policy. For instance, when admitting refugees or humanitarian cases, Canadian criteria have been based on vulnerability and need, not religious compatibility (Canada took large numbers of Vietnamese (mostly Buddhist or Catholic) in the 1970s, Ismaili Muslims from Uganda in the 1970s, Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s, Syrian Muslims in 2015, etc.).

The Laurentian elite’s influence can be seen in this consistent policy of openness; governments of both major parties (Liberals and Progressive Conservatives/Conservatives) largely upheld non-discriminatory criteria after the 1960s, even as they managed volumes differently. There is little evidence of any overt cultural or religious filtering in Canadian policy in the period 1970–2025, beyond security screening for extremist ties (which the U.S. also conducts). If anything, Canadian policymakers took steps to facilitate diversity – for example, by broadening the family reunification class to include parents and grandparents (thus bringing in more diverse older generations), or by creating programs to attract Francophone immigrants from non-traditional countries (like Morocco or Ivory Coast) to bolster French-speaking populations outside Quebec.

One could argue that the points system inherently “filters” for certain qualities – education, English/French language proficiency, skilled work experience – which indirectly correlates with certain source countries more than others. For instance, India’s and China’s large pools of educated, English-speaking professionals have done very well under Canada’s system, which might explain their dominance in recent intake. This is a cultural-philosophical filtering of a sort (favouring immigrants who can integrate economically and linguistically). The U.S. until recently did not have such a broad skilled immigration points system (relying instead on employer sponsorship and lotteries), so Canada attracted many who might have gone to the U.S. if work visas were more available. Indeed, during the Trump years, when the U.S. tightened work visa issuance and banned travel from certain countries, many foreign skilled workers and students chose Canada as an alternative (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations). Canada’s reputation for openness became a selling point: the CFR notes that Canada grew more attractive to immigrants in the last decade after Trump’s restrictive policies cut off some U.S. opportunities (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

U.S. Policy and Cultural Filtering: The United States, for its part, has formally eschewed ethnic or religious criteria in its immigration law since 1965 as well. However, in practice, certain programs and geopolitical factors introduced de facto cultural filters. During the Cold War, for instance, U.S. refugee policy favoured those fleeing communist regimes (which meant, for example, large numbers of Christian/Catholic anticommunist Cubans, Vietnamese, Eastern Europeans were welcomed – aligning with U.S. ideological stance).

In recent years, the starkest example of an intentional cultural filter was the Trump administration’s 2017 “Travel Ban”, which barred entry for nationals of several Muslim-majority countries (initially including Syria, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Yemen) on security grounds. This policy was widely viewed as singling out Muslim immigrants (even though the administration denied it was a “Muslim ban”).

Additionally, the Trump administration drastically reduced the refugee admissions ceiling, especially impacting refugees from Muslim-majority countries (for instance, effectively zeroing out Syrian refugee admissions by 2018). Canada, conversely, had no such ban and, in fact, capitalized on the contrast: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau tweeted in January 2017, “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith” – a statement interpreted as a rebuke to U.S. policy (implicitly saying Canada doesn’t filter by faith). The result was that Canada continued to admit people from countries that the U.S. was closing off. For example, in 2017–2019, some individuals from the banned countries who might have sought U.S. visas instead came to Canada.

The policy divergence meant that the cultural and religious makeup of newcomers diverged: while the U.S. was shutting doors to (mostly Muslim) populations from Iran, Somalia, Syria, etc., Canada was accepting refugees and immigrants from those very places. This intentional divergence in filtering (security vs humanitarian priorities) likely accelerated the differences in immigrant communities.

Another difference is in skill-based vs family-based admissions. Roughly 60% of Canada’s immigrants in recent years are economic (skill-based) immigrants (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library), whereas in the U.S. about two-thirds of legal immigrants are family-sponsored. Family reunification tends to reinforce existing ethnic concentrations (e.g. more Latin Americans bringing relatives in the U.S. case). Canada’s economic class, in contrast, actively recruits globally (often from Asia).

Canada also introduced a “Diversity” objective implicitly – not through a lottery like the U.S. Diversity Visa, but by not having per-country caps; this allowed big countries like India and China to dominate intake based purely on applicant quality and demand. The U.S. by law limits any single country to a certain share of visas (which, for high-demand countries like India/China, creates backlogs). Thus, ironically, U.S. policy constrained the influx from Asia to some extent, whereas Canada placed no such limits, resulting in even larger Asian shares.

Cultural Integration Approaches: Culturally, Canada’s integration policy (multiculturalism) differs from the U.S. philosophy (melting pot). Canada provides support for ethnic communities, mother-tongue education, and anti-discrimination laws that encourage retention of heritage. The U.S. generally expects integration into the English-speaking mainstream, with less state support for cultural retention (though in practice America is very multicultural as well). Over time, this could lead to Canadian immigrants maintaining distinct cultural identities more robustly, whereas immigrants in the U.S. might quicker blend into a singular American narrative (this is a debated point, but policy rhetorics differ).

In summary, Canadian immigration policy since the 1970s has deliberately removed cultural and religious barriers, and in the 2015–2025 period it remained extremely open to a wide array of source countries, in line with the country’s official multicultural ethos. The U.S., while formally not discriminatory in its immigration law, experienced episodes (especially 2017–2020) where policy was shaped by security fears and nativist sentiment, effectively filtering out some groups. This contributed to an immigrant population in Canada that is arguably more culturally and spiritually distinct from the traditional North American norm than the immigrant population in the U.S. is. Canadian immigrants today are, on average, less likely to be Christian (and if Christian, more likely non-European Christian), more likely to speak neither English nor French upon arrival (necessitating language acquisition, whereas many U.S. immigrants from e.g. Latin America already speak Spanish which, while not English, has some closer ties to U.S. historical communities), and more likely to hail from countries with very different legal and social traditions. This has pushed Canada’s policy framework to adapt (e.g., providing settlement services, recognizing foreign credentials, accommodating religious diversity in schools and workplaces), thus embedding multicultural principles deeply. In contrast, U.S. policies have often been reactive, dealing with challenges such as unauthorized migration or integration of Hispanic communities, but without an overarching policy of multiculturalism (the U.S. has no federal multiculturalism law or ministry, whereas Canada does).

Implications for Canada–U.S. Relations: Demographic-Cultural Divergence and Political/Strategic Drift

Finally, we examine whether the demographic and cultural divergence identified correlates with any increased tensions or strategic drift between Canada and the United States, especially visible during the Trump presidency (2017–2021). While many factors affect bilateral relations, the hypothesis posits that having a more culturally divergent Canada (due to immigration patterns) could lead to differences in national interests or worldviews vis-à-vis the U.S.

Trump Era Tensions: The Trump presidency indeed marked a low point in modern Canada–U.S. relations in several respects. Some of this was driven by specific policies: President Trump’s hard line on trade led to the renegotiation of NAFTA (with tense negotiations for Canada), imposition of tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, and even open talk by Trump of placing tariffs on Canadian autos. Culturally and diplomatically, there was an unusually open rift at times – famously, after the June 2018 G7 summit in Quebec, Trump insulted Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as “very dishonest and weak” over a trade dispute, leading to a diplomatic spat. These incidents were not directly caused by immigration issues or demographic divergence, but they were symptomatic of an underlying divergence in ideology: Trump’s nationalism and Trudeau’s globalism were on full display.

Immigration and refugee policy was one area where this ideological clash was clear. When the U.S. banned travel from certain Muslim-majority countries and slashed refugee admissions, Canada maintained its commitment to refugee resettlement from those areas. This led to a situation where Canada and the U.S. were sending opposite messages to the world’s immigrants and refugees. Canadian officials, including Trudeau, subtly criticized U.S. actions by reaffirming Canada’s contrasting stance (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations). At the grassroots level, Trump’s election and policies prompted some migrants present in the U.S. (often asylum-seekers who feared deportation) to move north and cross the Canadian border irregularly to claim asylum. Between 2017 and 2019, over 50,000 asylum seekers crossed from the U.S. into Canada at unofficial border points (such as Roxham Road in Quebec) (Asylum seekers and the case of Roxham Road on the Canada-US …), creating a domestic issue in Canada and some bilateral tension over the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA). The STCA required asylum seekers to claim refuge in the first safe country (meaning Canada could turn back those who came via the U.S. at official crossings), but because many entered at unofficial points, Canada had to process them. Canadian ministers discreetly pressed U.S. counterparts to address the flow. This mini-crisis was directly tied to divergent immigration climates: it was the restrictive U.S. climate under Trump that drove people to the more welcoming Canadian climate. It took until 2023 for Canada and the U.S. to update the STCA to cover the entire border, but during Trump’s term, the issue exemplified a growing difference in how the two countries were perceived as destinations.

On the world stage, Canada under Trudeau positioned itself as a defender of liberal internationalism (including taking strong stances on climate change, multi-lateralism, and human rights), often implicitly contrasting with the Trump administration’s skepticism of those values. The demographic makeup of each country can influence such positions: Canada’s large immigrant communities from around the world might make it more supportive of international cooperation and aid, and more sensitive to issues like racism or religious discrimination. For example, Canada championed a motion to condemn Islamophobia domestically, reflecting its sizable Muslim immigrant population; in the U.S., such a motion would have been far more contentious in the political arena, especially under Trump. Thus, one could argue that Canada’s more multicultural society has nudged its policies left-of-center on global issues, whereas the U.S., with a powerful nativist movement, took a different path in 2016–2020.

Strategic Drift Beyond Trump: Even beyond the Trump years, there are subtle signs of strategic drift. Canada’s foreign policy in the 2020s places a big emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, partly due to economic interests and partly due to a desire to diversify away from over-reliance on the U.S. market. The large Chinese and Indian diasporas in Canada provide economic and cultural bridges to Asia – e.g., Canada’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) explicitly notes the importance of engaging India (where 1 in 5 recent Canadian immigrants come from) (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations). While the U.S. is also pivoting to the Indo-Pacific (mainly to counter China), Canada’s approach might be differently calibrated, balancing ties with countries like China, India, and others where it has domestic constituencies. Indeed, Canada’s policy toward China has been more constrained by domestic public opinion (which soured after a diplomatic feud involving the arrest of a Huawei executive and subsequent Chinese retaliation). Chinese-Canadians – a significant community – have a stake in how Canada manages that relationship. The U.S., with a comparatively smaller percentage of Chinese-origin population (though sizeable in absolute terms), has taken a very hard line on China lately. This is just one example where demographic differences can influence policy nuance.

Another example: attitudes toward international immigration compacts or agreements. Canada has been supportive of the UN Global Compact for Migration; the U.S. under Trump withdrew from it. Canada’s self-image as a nation of immigrants (with nearly 23% of its population foreign-born, the highest in the G7 (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians)) reinforces its commitment to global migration frameworks, whereas the U.S., with ~14% foreign-born and a polarized immigration debate, has been more ambivalent.

Public Opinion and Alignment: Public opinion in the two countries also reflects some divergence that correlates with demographic reality. Polls show Canadians, on average, are more accepting of immigration and diversity than Americans (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

A striking two-thirds of Canadians in 2010 said immigration levels were about right or should be higher (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library) (though this has fluctuated with concerns over housing recently), whereas Americans have historically been more divided. These attitudes can feed into how each country views the other and cooperates. During Trump’s tenure, Canadian public opinion of the U.S. reached near record lows (according to Pew surveys), largely because Canadians disliked Trump’s values and perhaps felt “this is not the America we culturally identify with.” Conversely, some segments of American society (particularly on the right) started seeing Canada as a more “leftist” or “foreign” place rather than a familiar ally – a sentiment occasionally echoed in media (for instance, Fox News commentators deriding Canadian policies on health care, guns, or immigration).

The Laurentian elite context is also relevant: It has often prioritized a foreign policy somewhat independent of the U.S. when necessary (Pierre Trudeau, for example, opened relations with Cuba and China in the 1970s against U.S. preferences). Justin Trudeau, while aligned with U.S. Democrats, has had to navigate a world where U.S. leadership is less predictable. Mark Carney, although not (yet) a politician during the study period, embodies this elite perspective. In 2020, Carney spoke of the importance of “values-based” policy and hinted at the need for Canada to find new economic paths if global orders change.

By 2025, commentary attributed to Carney as PM declared the era of relying on U.S. economic leadership over (Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy | Reuters). This illustrates a perceived strategic realignment – Canada hedging its bets, developing its own path as U.S. policy became more protectionist and unpredictable.

The anger at the U.S. across the Canadian political spectrum during Trump’s tariff wars was notable, and it had a unifying effect in Canada – a country whose internal divides (East-West, French-English) are sometimes significant, but which came together in annoyance at the American administration’s treatment. In a sense, Trump’s approach may have accelerated Canadian national consciousness separate from North American identity.

It is difficult to draw a straight line from immigration-driven cultural change to high-level strategic rifts, because many other factors (leadership personalities, economic interests, global geopolitical shifts) are at play. However, our findings indicate that the period of greatest friction (2017–2021) coincided with leadership in each country that was catering to very different constituencies: Trump to a primarily native-born, nationalistic base concerned about immigration; Trudeau to a diverse, immigrant-rich electorate proud of multiculturalism. The result was divergent policies and some diplomatic strain. Even after Trump, some divergences remain – for example, approaches to climate policy and human rights – though under President Biden, Canada–U.S. relations improved as cultural/political alignments became closer (both governments being liberal and outward-looking). This suggests that the “drift” can be somewhat checked by leadership changes.

Nonetheless, the structural demographic differences are long-term. Canada will continue to have a higher immigrant share and a more globally-sourced populace than the U.S. If U.S. politics were to once again swing toward nativism (as could happen in future elections), we might expect renewed tensions. Canada’s increasing connections to the global south and Asia (through its diaspora networks) could also lead it to stake independent positions. For example, Canada might have differing views on immigration from certain countries or on international student flows – an issue where Canada has taken in huge numbers of international students from India and China, while the U.S. under Trump saw a decline. These educational and people-to-people ties also weave Canada into different global fabrics than the U.S.

In conclusion, we find that demographic and cultural divergence has correlated with some notable tensions and strategic re-considerations in the Canada–U.S. relationship, especially visible during the Trump years. Canadian leaders and thinkers openly mused that the old assumptions of ever-closer integration with the U.S. might no longer hold (End of an era for Canada-US ties, says Carney, as allies worldwide decry Trump’s car tariffs | Trump tariffs | The Guardian) (Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy | Reuters).

While it would be an overstatement to claim immigration changes alone caused this, they are part of a broader set of divergent trends. Canada’s identity – increasingly multicultural and internationally oriented – may at times conflict with an American identity that is wrestling with internal divisions over diversity. The Trump era provided a clear example of how differing cultural lenses (welcoming vs. restrictive toward global immigration) translated into policy friction. Thus, the hypothesis that a cultural divergence (fed by immigration policy differences) would lead to strategic drift finds some support in recent events. The next section discusses these implications further and balances them with counterarguments.

Discussion

The evidence assembled in the findings supports the theory that Canada’s accelerated demographic and cultural changes via immigration have, to a significant extent, moved it away from its once closer cultural alignment with the United States. However, this conclusion comes with nuances. In this discussion, we interpret what the divergence means, address potential counterpoints, and consider the broader implications for North American relations and domestic social cohesion in each country.

Extent and Nature of Cultural Divergence: Culturally, Canada and the U.S. still share many fundamental similarities – a legacy of European colonization, the English language (for most Canadians and virtually all Americans), and a liberal democratic political culture. Those core alignments remain strong. What appears to be changing is the plurality of cultures within Canada relative to the U.S. Canada is increasingly defining itself as a multi-civilizational country: one can find large communities that culturally connect Canada to South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean. The U.S., while diverse, has its largest minority connections to Latin America (which is part of the Western hemisphere and largely Judeo-Christian in heritage). This means Canada’s cultural tapestry now includes threads that are more distinctly different from those dominant in the U.S. This is evident in daily life – from the festivals celebrated, to the religions observed, to the languages spoken on Canadian streets. For example, Toronto and Vancouver are among the most ethnically diverse cities in the world, with no single ethnocultural majority; one could argue that these cities feel more “global” in character than a comparably sized U.S. city. On the other hand, cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Miami are also extremely diverse (though skewed toward certain groups like Hispanic and Asian). So the divergence is relative, not absolute. It is perhaps more accurate to say Canada has caught up to or exceeded the U.S. in diversity, overturning an older assumption that the U.S. was the quintessential “nation of immigrants.” Canada now has a higher foreign-born percentage and perhaps a wider spread of origins.

Influence of the Laurentian Elite: The role of the Laurentian elite in steering this course has been pivotal. From a historical perspective, Canadian elites in the late 20th century engineered a peaceful, if profound, transformation of Canada’s national identity framework – embedding multiculturalism and high immigration as pillars. This was done in part to solve internal issues (e.g., appeasing Quebec’s desire for recognition by broadening the notion of duality into multiculturalism, and also to populate and grow Canada’s economy). But it also had the effect of differentiating Canada from the U.S. Canadian elites often saw their country as needing an identity distinct from the “American melting pot” and the former British Empire (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).

Multiculturalism was a uniquely Canadian solution. Did it work? In terms of making Canada less American culturally, yes – today Canadians often pride themselves on being more tolerant, more international, and less insular than Americans. Our findings on immigration patterns reinforce that pride with data: Canada draws from everywhere, whereas the U.S. draws heavily from its backyard.

Mark Carney’s inclusion in our analysis is symbolic – he represents a new generation of Canadian elite figures with global profiles (head of the Bank of England, etc.) who think in terms of global systems. Carney, and others in Ottawa/Toronto/Montreal power circles, likely see Canada’s future as one that leverages its diversity to be a broker between worlds. This is a different mindset than, say, the Cold War-era Canadian elite who were content to be junior partners to the U.S. in a Western bloc.

If Canadian policy elites become more inclined to chart independent courses (especially if the U.S. oscillates in its reliability as a partner, as seen during Trump), then we could indeed witness a strategic drift where Canada sometimes goes its own way. The Guardian and Politico scenario of Carney declaring the friendship “over” (presumably in response to extreme U.S. protectionism) (End of an era for Canada-US ties, says Carney, as allies worldwide decry Trump’s car tariffs | Trump tariffs | The Guardian), while hypothetical, underscores that even stalwart Canadian centrists now contemplate scenarios of deep divergence.

Counterarguments: One could argue that despite differences in immigrant origins, Canada and the U.S. remain culturally aligned on many essential values. Immigrants to both countries, regardless of origin, often share aspirations that align with North American ideals – seeking freedom, economic opportunity, and a better future for their children. The integration of immigrants is also a dynamic process. Many immigrants (or their children) in Canada and the U.S. adopt elements of North American culture, and likewise influence it. For example, the presence of large South Asian communities in Canada has made Diwali a widely recognized celebration; similarly, Hispanic influence in the U.S. has popularized Cinco de Mayo or the Spanish language in public life. These changes do not necessarily cause international misalignment; rather, they add internal richness. It could be that Canada and the U.S. are both evolving in parallel towards more diverse societies – Canada just at a faster rate. The U.S. might follow (indeed, U.S. demographics project increasing Asian and African immigration in coming decades, and a continuing rise in the foreign-born share). So the divergence might be one of timing and degree, not a permanent chasm.

Moreover, when it comes to foreign policy and strategic interests, geography and economics often trump cultural factors. Canada will always have the U.S. as its neighbour and largest trading partner. Both countries benefit enormously from each other (trade, security partnerships like NORAD, etc.). No matter how multicultural Canada becomes, its security will depend on a strong North American alliance. In the same vein, the U.S. will always find in Canada a friendly nation with shared democratic values, even if Canada’s population includes diverse voices. One might note that during crises, Canada and the U.S. tend to stand together – for example, intelligence and defense cooperation remained solid even during Trump (the fundamental NORAD partnership was not shaken). So strategically, the “drift” might be limited to rhetoric and non-core areas. Indeed, as soon as President Biden (a more traditional internationalist) took office in 2021, Canada–U.S. relations warmed significantly, suggesting that political alignment can override demographic differences.

Domestic Social Cohesion vs. Bilateral Alignment: It is also worth discussing that while Canada has managed high diversity with relatively less backlash, the U.S. has experienced more internal conflict over immigration. This is somewhat paradoxical because one might expect more conflict where there is more change (i.e., in Canada). Some scholars attribute Canada’s social cohesion amid diversity to its policies and narrative – multiculturalism gave immigrants a sense of belonging and gave the native-born a sense that diversity is part of the national story (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library).

In the U.S., the lack of a similar narrative – plus the undocumented immigration issue – made immigration seem more threatening to some. The rise of Trumpism can be seen in part as a backlash by segments of America that felt culturally threatened (by Latin American immigration, globalization, etc.). In Canada, a comparable populist anti-immigrant surge has been weak (the People’s Party of Canada gained under 2% of the vote in the 2021 election, despite running on anti-immigration sentiments). This means that internally, Canada and the U.S. are at different points on the spectrum of accepting diversity. This internal difference in public opinion can in turn influence how each country interacts externally. For instance, a Canada more at ease with diversity can sign onto compacts or take positions that a polarized U.S. might avoid. Over time, if these attitudes persist, Canada and the U.S. could vote differently in international forums or prioritize different global issues (e.g., Canada might be more vocal on anti-racism or religious tolerance initiatives, reflecting its domestic mosaic, whereas the U.S. might be more focused on assimilation and counterterrorism).

Correlation vs. Causation: Another point for discussion is causality. Has Canada’s immigration-driven cultural shift caused it to diverge from the U.S., or are both outcomes (divergence and cultural shift) the result of other factors? One could argue that Canadian and American political paths diverged for reasons not solely related to immigration – for example, differences in political institutions, media, and historical narratives. Canada did not experience something analogous to the U.S. civil rights movement’s scale or the Vietnam War’s social upheaval in the 1960s; instead, it had the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and bilingualism debates, which led to a different set of policy choices (like multiculturalism). These choices then influenced immigration. So cause and effect intertwine: policy elites made conscious choices (in part to differentiate from the U.S.), which changed demographics, which then reinforced a distinct identity. The “Laurentian elite” might have pushed multiculturalism also as a nation-building tool to unify a country that could otherwise be fragmented (regionalism, Quebec nationalism). It succeeded in that Canada is relatively unified today, but a byproduct is a unique identity vis-à-vis the U.S.

Future Trajectories: If current trends continue, by 2040 or 2050 Canada could have an even larger foreign-born share (possibly over 30%) (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians), with an even greater proportion from Asia and Africa. The U.S. will also have more immigrants, but given its population base, it is projected to remain around 15–18% foreign-born by mid-century (unless immigration levels change drastically). So Canada could truly be an outlier among Western nations in diversity. This may position Canada as a test case for a successful post-national state (Justin Trudeau once remarked that Canada is the “first postnational state” with no core identity – a statement debated hotly in Canada).

The U.S., in contrast, still clings to an overarching American identity narrative, even as it diversifies. The sustainability of Canada’s model will have implications for how much divergence is tolerable or beneficial. If Canada thrives with its model and continues to find common cause with the U.S. on major issues, then the divergence is just cosmetic. But if internal pressures or external shocks cause Canada to pivot (for example, a severe economic downturn leading to anti-immigrant sentiment, or a security incident causing mistrust of certain immigrant groups), then Canada might retrench somewhat or the U.S.–Canada gap could narrow in approach.

Conversely, the U.S. might also change: it could become more restrictive and nativist (widening the gap with Canada’s openness), or it could swing back to a pro-immigration consensus (narrowing the gap). For instance, comprehensive immigration reform in the U.S. that shifts to more skills-based intake (as Canada does) could increase Asian immigration to the U.S., making its immigrant mix more like Canada’s. These policies are not static.

Strategic Alignment: On strategic drift, it is notable that despite the tensions of 2017–2020, by 2021 the countries coordinated again on major issues (like COVID-19 border closures and reopening, and a unified response to Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022). Cultural divergence did not stop Canada from working closely with the U.S. when political leadership aligned. This suggests that geopolitical necessity can override cultural differences. However, a culturally distinct Canada might have different priorities: for example, Canada might place relatively more importance on maintaining good relations with countries of origin of its immigrants (India, China, Philippines, the Caribbean nations) than the U.S. does, which could sometimes cause minor friction if U.S. priorities clash (such as U.S.-China rivalry putting Canada in a tough spot with its Chinese diaspora and economic ties). We saw an example in 2018–2020 where Canada was caught in the middle of the U.S.-China dispute (detaining Huawei’s CFO on a U.S. extradition request led China to detain Canadian citizens). In that saga, some argued Canada was suffering for being aligned with the U.S. against China’s anger, while others pointed out Canada was upholding rule of law. Public opinion in Canada hardened against China as a result, despite the large Chinese-Canadian community. So cultural ties do not always dictate policy – principle and alliance did in this case.

In conclusion, the discussion acknowledges that the hypothesis holds water: Canada has changed in ways that make it less culturally parallel to the U.S., and this has had observable effects on how each country perceives and interacts with the other. The divergence is not absolute and is tempered by the enduring bonds and common foundations the two countries share. But it is significant enough that policymakers must be mindful of it. For Canadians, it means understanding that U.S. decisions might not always favour a multicultural worldview; for Americans, it means recognizing that Canada may not always be in lockstep if U.S. policy conflicts with the values of Canada’s diverse society. The challenge and opportunity lie in managing this divergence constructively – maintaining a strong partnership while respecting that the two societies may chart different cultural paths.

Conclusion

This research set out to test the theory that accelerated changes in Canadian immigration policy and demographics have pushed Canada away from cultural alignment with the United States, especially under the leadership of figures like Pierre Trudeau and Justin Trudeau and the guidance of the Laurentian elite. Through a comprehensive examination of historical data, recent statistics, and policy developments, we find robust evidence that Canada’s immigrant population has indeed shifted dramatically in origin and makeup since the 1970s, resulting in a country that is culturally more pluralistic and globally representative. This shift is most pronounced in the period from 2015 to 2025, during which Canadian immigration reached record levels and drew overwhelmingly from Asia and Africa, in stark contrast to earlier eras dominated by European inflows. Concurrently, the United States – while also more diverse than before – has retained a comparatively larger share of Western-hemisphere (Latin American) immigration and a higher proportion of Christian-affiliated immigrants. Thus, a divergence in the types of immigrants each country attracts has occurred and is measurable: Canada’s intake is disproportionately non-Western and non-Christian (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca) (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity), whereas U.S. immigration, though changing, remains more Western-oriented by comparison (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report) (Religions of immigrants | EBSCO Research Starters).

We also conclude that Canadian immigration policy’s “filters” have evolved in a way that contrasts with U.S. filters, particularly in the last decade. Canadian policy, grounded in multiculturalism and a universalistic points system, did not impose religious or cultural tests and even expanded efforts to welcome those cast out elsewhere (such as refugees from Muslim-majority nations during the Trump years). The U.S., especially 2017–2020, implemented policies that implicitly or explicitly filtered entrants by nationality and religion (e.g. travel bans, reduced refugee slots). This led to Canada and the U.S. effectively selecting for different immigrant profiles and values – Canada projecting itself as open to all, the U.S. sending a message of selectivity based on perceived security/cultural compatibility. Canada’s immigrant population today can thus be said to be culturally and spiritually distinct in composition from America’s immigrant population, fulfilling part of the hypothesis.

When examining impacts on bilateral relations, the findings suggest a correlation between these demographic/cultural divergences and moments of strategic drift or tension. The clearest example was during Donald Trump’s presidency, when divergent worldviews on immigration and diversity between Ottawa and Washington contributed to frictions. Canada’s multicultural ethos and continuing intake of global migrants stood in moral opposition to the U.S. administration’s nationalist, restrictionist stance (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations). This not only strained diplomatic relations at times but also physically manifested in irregular migration flows from the U.S. to Canada. Moreover, prominent Canadian voices (including elite policymakers like Mark Carney) began to articulate that the old model of deep integration with the U.S. might need rethinking in light of America’s turn inward (End of an era for Canada-US ties, says Carney, as allies worldwide decry Trump’s car tariffs | Trump tariffs | The Guardian) (Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy | Reuters). In short, demographic and cultural divergence has gone hand-in-hand with some degree of political and strategic divergence in recent years.

However, the evidence also counsels caution in assigning sole causality. Canada and the U.S. remain bound by geography, economics, and shared fundamental principles. The divergence in immigration and culture is one factor among many in the relationship. During periods of political alignment (e.g., the Biden-Trudeau cooperation), many differences recede in importance. It appears that immigration-driven cultural change is a contributing factor to Canada’s distinct path, rather than a deterministic one. The Laurentian elite’s longstanding policies did set Canada on a divergent trajectory from the U.S., aiming for a multicultural society distinct from the American melting pot. That objective has largely been realized. Canadians today generally see their country as more mosaic-like and socially liberal than the U.S., and demographic data backs this perspective (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca) (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations). This has arguably given Canada greater social resilience and international credibility as a diverse nation, but it also means Canada’s domestic consensus on issues like immigration can be quite different from U.S. domestic debates.

In concluding, we affirm that the hypothesis stands: Accelerated demographic and cultural changes through immigration have shifted Canada’s cultural alignment away from that of the United States. The shift is evident in the origins and religions of Canada’s immigrant communities and has been especially pronounced from Pierre Trudeau’s reforms through Justin Trudeau’s tenure. This does not imply a rupture in the Canada–U.S. friendship – rather, it indicates that the two countries may sometimes diverge in policy preferences and perceptions due to their different makeup. For policymakers, the lesson is that a “one-size-fits-all” North American approach may not always work; understanding each other’s domestic context is key. For scholars and observers, Canada offers an example of a Western country that has deliberately gone in a multicultural direction, and it will be illuminating to watch how this influences its relationship with a United States that, while diverse, is charting its own course in grappling with identity and immigration.

Future Research: This study focused on the 1970s through mid-2020s; future research could examine subsequent developments, especially if there are major shifts in either country’s immigration policy (for instance, if the U.S. were to adopt a points system, or if Canada were to alter its openness due to capacity concerns like housing).

Another avenue is to study how second-generation outcomes (children of immigrants) in Canada and the U.S. compare – do they lead to convergence (as children integrate) or do initial differences persist into later generations?

Additionally, as global politics evolve, one could analyze whether Canada’s diverse population alters its foreign policy orientations in measurable ways (e.g., voting patterns at the UN, coalition preferences). The long-term durability of Canada’s multicultural consensus itself is a subject for ongoing observation: will economic or social strains challenge the very policy that created this divergence? As of 2025, Canada appears committed to high immigration and diversity, and the U.S. remains a culturally influential yet somewhat more insular giant. The interplay between these two North American neighbours will continue to be a barometer of how diversity and national identity shape international partnerships in the 21st century.

Title: “U.S. Military General Explains Why Canada Is Required For US National Security!” https://youtu.be/9dNI6H1SExs?feature=shared

Title: “Forget China! Trump Starts War With Canada Over Resources!” https://youtu.be/IF8dtEGRobg?feature=shared

References

Global News (2013): Lee-Anne Goodman, “Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history.” Global News (Canadian Press), May 8, 2013. – Data on religious affiliation of new Canadian immigrants (47.5% Christian in 2011, down from 78% in 1971) (Religion marks a divergent path in Canadian-US history – National | Globalnews.ca).
CFR Backgrounder (2024): Diana Roy & Amelia Cheatham, “What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy?” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated March 28, 2024. – Overview of Canadian immigration system; notes points system (1967) leading to more immigrants from Africa, Asia, Latin America (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations); recent top source countries (India, China, etc.) and record-high admissions (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations); comparison to U.S. Trump-era policies (What Is Canada’s Immigration Policy? | Council on Foreign Relations).
Statistics Canada – The Daily (2022a): “Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians,” The Daily release, Oct 26, 2022. – 2021 Census highlights; notes decline in Europe’s share and rise of Asia’s share among immigrants (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians); immigrants 23% of population in 2021 (The Daily — Immigrants make up the largest share of the population in over 150 years and continue to shape who we are as Canadians).
Statistics Canada – The Daily (2022b): “The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity,” The Daily release, Oct 26, 2022. – Provides stats on religion among immigrants 2011–2021 (18.9% Muslim, 9.0% Hindu, 5.8% Sikh) (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity) and proportion of various faith communities that are immigrants (The Daily — The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country’s religious and ethnocultural diversity).
StatCan 150 Years (2016): Statistics Canada, “150 years of immigration in Canada,” 2016 (Cat. 11-630-X2016006). – Historical census analysis; notes 28.3% of immigrants born in UK and 51.4% in other Europe in 1971 (total ~80% European) (150 years of immigration in Canada); rise of Asia by 2011 and surpassing of UK by China and India as top sources (150 years of immigration in Canada).
DHS Annual Flow Report (2023): Office of Homeland Security Statistics, “U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2022,” August 2023. – U.S. immigration statistics; top countries for new green cards in FY2022: Mexico, India, China, Dominican Republic, Cuba (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report); regional breakdown of immigrant origins (U.S. Lawful Permenent Residents: 2022 Annual Flow Report).
Pew / EBSCO (2020): Pew Research / EBSCO Research Starters, “Religions of Immigrants.” – Discusses religious makeup of U.S. immigrants; notes ~70% of U.S. immigrants were Christian as of 2020, and about 55% in the 2020s with 32% Muslim or Hindu (Religions of immigrants | EBSCO Research Starters).
Migration Policy Institute (2012): Irene Bloemraad, “Understanding ‘Canadian Exceptionalism’ in Immigration and Pluralism Policy,” MPI, July 2012 (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library) (Understanding “Canadian Exceptionalism” in Immigration and Pluralism Policy | Immigration Research Library). – Explores why Canada is more open/positive about immigration; cites high economic immigrant share, geography limiting illegal flows, multiculturalism as national identity marker.
American Affairs (2021): Michael Cuenco, “A Tale of Two Immigration Systems: Canada and the United States,” American Affairs, Vol. V No. 1, Spring 2021. – Analyzes differences between Canadian and U.S. immigration approaches; (Referenced conceptually regarding Canada’s stringent system vs U.S. system) (The Canadian Ideology – American Affairs Journal).
The Guardian (2025): Jon Henley, “End of an era for Canada-US ties, says Carney, as allies worldwide decry Trump’s car tariffs,” The Guardian, Mar 27, 2025. – Hypothetical scenario with PM Mark Carney; quotes Carney: “the old relationship… is over” due to Trump’s actions (End of an era for Canada-US ties, says Carney, as allies worldwide decry Trump’s car tariffs | Trump tariffs | The Guardian), reflecting perceived strategic drift.
Reuters (2025): Reuters Staff, “Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy,” Reuters, April 3, 2025. – Scenario of PM Carney responding to U.S. tariffs; includes quote: “80-year period when the U.S. … is over. This is a tragedy,” Carney said (Canada unveils limited counter measures against US, calls Trump move a tragedy | Reuters), highlighting break in integration.
Immigration Research (2023): (UnHerd/Michael Cuenco), “Canada’s cynical immigration racket,” UnHerd, Aug 2023. – Critical perspective on Canada’s immigration surge and its underlying economic motives; highlights target of 1.5 million new residents by 2025 (Canada’s cynical immigration racket – UnHerd). (Used for context on elite motives).

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